도시재생을 위한 시민참여 방안 연구

2016년  5월

이 승 준

국외훈련 개요

1. 훈  련  국: 영국

2. 훈련기관명: 버밍엄 대학교

(University of Birmingham)

3. 훈 련 분 야: 도시계획

4. 훈 련 기 간: 2014. 7 ~ 2016. 7

Abstract

Urban regeneration experiences in the UK have recently attracted interest from policy makers in South Korea around community participation and a holistic approach. In the past, the UK saw property-led regeneration led by authorities or developers as a way to improve deprived areas. Regeneration policy then changed to holistic approaches based more on local community participation. The interest from South Korea is about how to change policies and whether new approaches were effective compare to previous initiatives.

With rapid economic growth, South Korea has extended existing urban areas and built new developments to meet growing demand, while also promoting the redevelopment of existing urban areas. Various problems emerged in the process of planning and implementing (re) development. Consequently, there are increasing calls for new approaches to the renewal of deprived areas, and community participation and holistic approach are central to this.

For decades, UK governments have addressed problems associated with urban deprivation to improve physical, social and economic conditions. Community participation was at the heart of one flagship programme, the ‘New Deal for Communities’. This UK experience can provide some policy guidance to South Korea where the country is still struggling to move in a similar direction.

In this context, this dissertation is aimed at analysing UK and Korea policy in terms of urban community participation and the outcomes of holistic approaches. Similarities and differences between the two countries are identified and some policy implications in relation to the outcomes of holistic intervention are suggested.

Keywords: urban regeneration, community participation, holistic approach, area based initiatives, New Deal for Community

Contents

Introduction …………………………………………………………………….. 1

Methodology and Structure …………………………….…………………… 6

Methodology ……………………………………………………………. 6

Structure ………………………………………………………………… 7

Urban Regeneration in South Korea ………………………….…………. 8

The History of Urban Regeneration ……………………………...... 8

Urban Regeneration Process and Participation ………………...... 9

Unveiled Problems and New Approaches to Regeneration ....…12

Yeonnam-dong RPRP Case Study …………………………….......14

Urban Regeneration in the UK ……………………….……….….…………21

Community participation and partnership …………...................... 21

Area based regeneration ……………………..……........................ 29

Innovation during New Labour period and evaluation …........… 33

The New Deal for Communities Programme ……...................... 34

The Birmingham Experience ……………………………................ 48

Conclusion and Recommendations ………………...…….…………….… 60

Reference ……………………………………………………........................ 64

List of table and figures

Table 1.     Percentage point change 2002-2008

Figure 1.    Summary of Urban Redevelopment Acts in South Korea

Figure 2.	Yeonnam-dong RPRP Profile in 2011

Figure 3.	Factors that affect the capacity change and participation intention

Figure 4.	Roles and participants under the Urban Renewal Act in 2013

Figure 5.	Summary of test bed project in 2011

Figure 6.    Allocation for ten-year NDC funding

Figure 7.	Roles and responsibilities of the main participants

Figure 8.	Ingredient of success

Figure 9.	NDC spend percentage by outcomes between 2000 and 2008

Figure 10.	Aston Pride Governance Structure

Figure 11.	Socio-demographic indicator of Aston and Kings Norton

Figure 12.	Total expenditure of Aston and Kings Norton NDC by theme

1. Introduction

Defining regeneration has never been straightforward (Parkinson, 1996). The term has meant different things to different people at different times. It is sometimes defined as the policy inputs and the resources invested in the regeneration process; money, time and people. It is also defined as the outputs of the investment - houses built, training schemes provided, jobs created, roads built and land reclaimed. At other times, it is defined more specifically as the impact of that investment; economic, social and environmental changes or improvements that such investment has produced in the urban arena. It has also been seen as the process of involving and maximizing the contribution of different partners, such as the community or the private sector, in regeneration (OECD, 2014).

Regeneration was seen as a way to reverse the decline of industrial cities associated with the loss of manufacturing industry over the second part of the twentieth century. Industrial decline had led to severe dereliction and depopulation in certain areas, creating a series of social and economic problems, particularly within inner cities. A key question driving urban regeneration was how to make cities attractive places in which to live and work. More recently the issue of providing adequate housing supply for the population has returned to the fore, as soaring house prices and increased levels of household formation have exacerbated shortages around the country. Rather than concrete over the countryside with sprawling new developments, existing cities are seen as the ideal places in which to solve housing shortages by bringing derelict land back into use. This has been reflected in rapid population growth within some cities since the late 1990s (Jones and Evans, 2013). Past interpretations of regeneration that have referred to it as simply being the delivery of physical regeneration have needed to adapt constantly to the changing economy, changing policy contexts, changing roles of central and local government and to altered circumstances in local areas.

Urban policy including regeneration in the UK can be characterised as a series of political experiments. However, Area Based Initiatives (ABI) have been a key concept of regeneration for nearly forty years from urban programmes designated in the 1960s to the New Deal for Communities program (NDCs) in the 2000s, and have been viewed as a means of democratic renewal, community engagement and practical problem solving in deprived areas to tackle the root cause of inequality and deprivation (Muscat, 2010).

At the heart of the ABI approach is the idea that coordinated investment in individual sectors including physical and social initiatives in an area can create synergy effects, leading to strengthened social cohesion as well as improving the physical environment (Agger, 2015). Central government support and funding, local government and various local partners representing local people in ABIs emphasis the role of the local residents for both planning and implementing local regeneration schemes. Here, the role of central government is to help local authorities and communities to help themselves. (Lawless, 2006). In the 1990s, the scale of area-based initiatives increased, focusing more closely on the needs of disadvantaged groups and individuals at the local level aiming to bring about holistic economic and social regeneration mainly at the level of the ‘neighbourhood’ via property and market-led policies targeted at small geographic areas in 1980s (Croeley et al. 2012).

Whereas in many Western European countries including the UK, ABIs with community engagement have been promoted for three decades as a way of urban regeneration, in South Korea ABIs are just starting to be seen as a tool to tackle social exclusion and economic deprivation

Urban renewal in South Korea started in the late of 1960s and was led by the state with physical environment improvement strategies based on clearance and bulldozing. These state led renewal policies were popular with both private developers and the state as they generated large profits. However, most residents became victims of these policies, and this resulted in protests against the programmes in the urban target areas caused by the unequal distribution of renewal profits and exclusion from the decision making process. (Lee, 2000). Facing strong opposition, the mode of renewal gradually changed toward incorporating various sectors including the community and private sectors, though the speed of change has been quite slow.

A representative programme was the Joint Redevelopment Programme, Haptong Chaegaebal which was implemented in 1983. Under the Joint Redevelopment Programme, property owners formed housing association and then chose a construction firm that also became a member of the association. The firm then built high rise apartments in the area of the original squatter units and sold the surplus units to former property owners and the general public. While the former property owners had a right to residency and could buy a unit at a discounted price, the remaining units were made available to the general public through a lottery system without discount. (Lee, 2000). Both property owners and construction firms actively and enthusiastically participated in Joint Redevelopment Programmes resulting in the completion of a number of large-scale clearance based renewal projects in cities.

The government did not get involved officially in the process of the Joint Redevelopment Programmes, but had no reason not to encourage the programme as they could profit from the sale of its properties and from the creation of a new tax base as well as avoiding the responsibilities arising from direct participation in the project (Lee, 2000).

These property led renewal projects, pursuing only economic profits, are a high growth type that in order to be successful requires steady growth in the real estate market and high growth of the national economy to support them. This approach did not fit well with domestic economic conditions characterised by slow growth following the international financial crisis in 2008. Problems with implementation were further compounded by conflict in project districts over measures for tenant residence / migration, low existing residents’ resettlement rates and between association members and non-members regarding residents’ compensation. As a result publicity has been significantly undermined leading to local communities being destroyed. (Kyung, 2011).

Ultimately, significant changes in urban renewal policies began in South Korea reflecting international changes in urban renewal trends. Instead of tearing down buildings and starting anew, regions across South Korea have given neglected areas a new purpose for public use. Community led urban regeneration projects have been announced for residential areas by central government that do not involve large scale demolishment – a significant change from past practice.

In 2013, the Special Act on Promotion and Support for Urban Regeneration (Urban Regeneration Act) was enacted by central government to facilitate systematic public support, including project co-ordination and connection as well as locally-initiated project planning. In contrast to previous property-based, privately-led renewal programmes this Act adopted a new approach forcing municipalities across the country to enact ordinances for urban renewal and set up a regeneration strategic plan (Cho, 2014) incorporating area based comprehensive, community led regeneration and government’s package support, focusing on the role and support system of the public sector. (Yang and Lee, 2013)

This is a similar concept to urban policy in 1990s and 2000s in the UK that aimed to bring about holistic regeneration, both economic and social, mainly at the level of the neighbourhood as well as attempting to reduce regional disparities. However, this approach is not without its critics, some researchers who believe that the core value of regeneration is boosting the economy and providing more jobs for disadvantaged people have argued that approaches to economic development based on supporting particular places had only limited impact in regeneration. (Croeley et al., 2012).

In terms of community participation, even though the South Korean government has strengthened community engagement and participation in both urban regeneration and planning in keeping with the growing global trend towards community democracy in politics, it is not clear whether the new approach toward community is working. This could be because of differences in the meaning of the term ‘participation’ between western countries and South Korea as well as the difficulty and the complexity of the participatory process.

This dissertation will explore the following research questions through case studies of ABIs in the UK, especially, New Deal for Communities as a flagship initiative as a focus for evaluation comparing them with new ABIs in South Korea. It will then draw lessons for South Korea for effective community participatory ABIs.

Does an holistic approach to ABIs based on community participation result in better outcomes?

What does contribute to more positive change between people related and place related interventions in ABIs?

How authorities and other public bodies could support community led initiative?

2. Methodology and Structure

2.1 Methodology

To find answers to the research questions, this dissertation will compare case studies from South Korea and the UK. In the first phase, it will consider the differences between South Korea and the UK, and will then make comparisons between UK case studies.

The research mainly relies on existing secondary sources including official policy reports, academic articles, books and journals dealing with urban regeneration policies and programmes. The focus is on the last decade of urban regeneration policy, specifically in the UK, on one of the most resourced and extensively evaluated representative policies of recent urban regeneration programmes, the New Deal for Communities (NDCs).

NDCs were chosen for the research firstly because they represented a new approach to tackling deprivation in that partnerships had responsibility for the success of the program. Secondly, they had a long time span - partnerships were granted for 10 years, considerably longer than previous English ABIs. Thirdly, they had substantial government funding. As a result there are a wide range of government evaluation reports available that detail changes in the designated areas. Because a wide range of issues such as employment, crime and physical environment were dealt with in the programme and each partnership focused on different issues according to circumstance, it is possible to draw implications from comparing outcomes from different partnerships.

Two Birmingham NDC areas (Kings Norton Three Estates and Aston Pride NDCs) were chosen for UK case studies. Although both Kings Norton Three Estates and Aston Pride partnership are in Birmingham, the outcomes from the programme were significantly different. Consequently it is possible to draw meaningful results by researching what made better outcomes in an holistic regeneration program. The main sources and evidence of the research are from local and national evaluations report as well as National Statistics.

Yeonnam-dong RPRP is the subject of the case study in South Korea, as this project shows similarity with UK approaches to regeneration. The data resource is also secondary data.

2.2 Structure

The next section presents a brief historical analysis of South Korean regeneration policies illustrated by a case study. The third section similarly describes regeneration policies in the UK with two case study examples. The fourth section reviews finding from the case studies and the final section draws conclusion and recommendations.

3. Urban regeneration in South Korea

3.1 The History of Urban Regeneration

With rapid economic growth, South Korea has extended existing urban areas and built new developments to meet growing demand for urban area. At the same time existing urban area re-development projects have also been promoted to improve the quality of urban functions and meet environmental requirement in cities.

Urban development projects were conducted by individual Acts for decades, then some of the development Acts were integrated into the ‘Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents Act’ in 2002. However, although this Act was for supporting urban regeneration and residential maintenance, there was almost no financial support from the public sector. This resulted in scattered, small scale (generally land owner association) led development and subsequently excessive urban infrastructure burdening became an issue. The resulting redevelopment, driven by market forces with a focus on increasing profitability led to the clearance of existing buildings and urban structures, and as a consequence the destruction of established communities through limited resettlement of the original residents.

Figure 1 Summary of Urban Redevelopment Acts in South Korea

Date	Residential Improvement District	Urban Environment Improvement	House Reconstruction	Maintenance Promotion
1960’s		Urban Planning Act (1962)
1970’s		Urban Redevelopment Act (1976)	Housing Construction Promotion Act(1972)
1980’s	Temporary measures for residential improvement for low-income citizen (1989)
2000’s	Maintenance and improvement of urban areas and dwelling conditions for residents Act (2002)		Special Act on the Promotion of Urban Renewal (2005)

Source: Chung et al. (2009), Kim et al. (2013)

Subsequent legislation in the form of the Special Act on the Promotion of Urban Renewal (2005) that sought to solve the problems of private sector led development also focused on improving the physical environment, and did not include more comprehensive improvements such as culture, economy and society.

In addition, this type of renewal project required a market in which property prices rise steadily, landowners profited from redevelopment by selling new properties to buyers without public sector financial support. Following the global financial crisis of 2008 buyers became reluctant to buy new expensive properties, so that renewal projects that could not guarantee economic profits were no longer implemented.

3.2 Urban Regeneration Process and Participation

Though there are individual Acts for specific projects, most planning and (re)development related Acts are similar in terms of process. Related to existing urban redevelopment project, the legal system is not largely changed. In South Korea, an urban regeneration project generally follows the following four phases (Yu and Kwon, 2011) though it could be slightly different depending on the types and actors of the regeneration project, for example, private-led or public-led:

Phase 1: Developing a master plan

The master plan focuses on the specific area with conceptual directions and goals for the development of the regeneration area. The development of a master plan is undertaken by local authorities and is subject to approval from local government. In the case of private led renewal plans such as Rearrangement Projects, the Major/Do Governor such as The Special Metropolitan City Mayor, a Metropolitan City Mayor formulates a master plan for urban and residential environment rearrangement following deliberation by the local urban planning committee. Then, the head of the autonomous Si/Gun/Gu formulate a rearrangement plan, compatible with the master plan, containing plans for:

installing joint-use facilities

the main usage, building-to-land ratio, building volume ratio, and height of structures

the protection of an educational environment

A request to local government to designate a Rearrangement Zone follows explanatory meetings with residents and feedback from the local council. Landowners can also propose the formulation of a Rearrangement Plan, in this case, the Plan is drawn by a private sector re-development steering committee or an association (South Korea, 2013)

Phase 2: Deciding the Project Promoter

A project promoter implements the master plan. A public agency, a private company (association) and a public-private partnership can be project promoters. Generally in housing re-development projects an association of landowners is the most common private sector project promoter through approval from the local authority. However, in brown-field and declined commercial area redevelopment projects, public agencies and private companies become project promoters.

Phase 3: Developing an Implementation Plan

The goal of an individual urban regeneration project is to implement the existing urban regeneration master plan as individual project are a part of the regeneration master plan. In this phase, construction schemes are planned and finance is also allocated.

Phase 4: Implementing the Urban Regeneration Project

In this phase, actual project implementation activities are undertaken, such as the demolition of existing buildings; construction of new buildings; relocation of current residents; pre-sale of planned spaces, buildings and facilities (Yu and Kwon, 2011)

Following the above process, state-led growth has focused on industrialisation for the past decades, provoking criticism that this has contributed to unbalanced and unsustainable development and that unbalanced developments seen in private-led projects such as housing rearrangement have become a means to maximize economic returns (OECD, 2014).

When it comes to urban management and urban master plans, citizen participation tended to be undertaken mainly for administrative convenience within a limited framework. According to Arnstein (1969) informing, such as newsletters and responses to inquiries and consultation such as resident surveys and public hearings as well as input from government advisory and planning committees are regarded as tokenism in citizen participation.

The International Association for Public Participation (2007) identifies five phases of participation: inform, consult, involve, collaborate and empower. Inform, such as providing information, websites and public meeting is the lowest level of participation and empower, such as local referendum and delegation is the highest. In South Korea methods of citizen participation utilised in the urban planning process are in most cases to consult through providing information, undertaking surveys and public meetings, over the Internet, billboards and public hearings. The introduction of civic participation in urban planning began in 1981 through public hearing by notice, then websites in 2002. Feedback about citizen opinion was introduced in 2000 (Yang, 2011). As can be seen, the process and ways of civic participation has not changed significantly.

Furthermore, only property owners could participate in property led renewal projects, excluding residents who did not have ownership. Considering the limited scope of participation it could not be described as public involvement but ownership participation.

3.3 Unveiled Problems and New Approaches to Regeneration

South Korea urban regeneration has emphasized the promotion of private investment for restructuring and improving the physical environment and function without diagnosing the causes of urban decay and consideration of the established community. Accordingly, the existing renewal programme is criticised as follows:

Firstly, as urban regeneration project implementation depended on the profitability of private actors (association), renewal projects were not promoted in low-margin areas. Since the late 2000 global credit crisis most renewal projects ceased across the country except for metropolitan areas, resulting in the growth of underserved communities and increasing regional disparities.

Secondly, renewal projects focused on physical redevelopment based on housing redevelopment (Cho, 2014), so that another areas such as non-residential urban function refurbishment was insufficient. Additionally these projects were based on large scale clearance causing various social problems such as low original resident resettlement rates, including tenants, and conflicts between local residents.

Thirdly, the role and support of the public was insufficient in renewal projects.  Public facilities establishment costs in urban environment improvement and housing development projects was residents responsibility with little support from central and local government. (Cho, 2014). This resulted in weakening the momentum for the promotion of projects

Finally, although there were efforts to incorporate the relevant Acts and regulations for the effective promotion of maintenance projects by central government, the approach was still one of considering projects on an individual basis. A lack of linkages between projects led to unnecessary, redundant investment and limited a comprehensive approach to encompassing social, cultural, economic issues.

As a result, both property led and private led clearance based urban renewal policies for decades cause cumulative problems in terms of both the physical and socio cultural environment in South Korea. Ultimately, government tried to overcome those challenges by regenerating declining existing urban area and neighbourhoods by strengthening civic participation in the urban renewal process as well as encouraging community led regeneration projects.

Strengthening Resident Involvement

Response to these issues started first in local government. Seoul, for instance, introduced a project called 'human town' in 2008 to improve the living environment in terms of the physical aspect to density in low-rise residential areas, recognizing the problems caused by the redevelopment of the existing scheme. Since then, the central government amended the law in 2012 to create residential environment management projects in which local government enlarge and rearrange basic and shared-use facilities, and property owners preserve, rearrange, and improve houses, so called ‘Resident Participatory Regeneration Projects (RPRP) in low-rise residential areas (South Korea, 2013)

3.4 Yeonnam-dong RPRP Case Study

'Yeonnam-dong' in Seoul is the first pilot project area for RPRP. It was designated in November 2010 through agreement with residents, (the agreement rate was 51.23%) and was conducted until September 2013. (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Yeonnam-dong RPRP Profile in 2011

Region	Yeonnam-dong, Mapo-gu Seoul
Project area/ Household	82,900㎡/1,325 unit
Plan	Building government office building as a Community Hub Form, scale and use of building and land. Road and park improvement, CCTV installing, burying of telephone poles and electric wires etc.
Residents Agreement	Project agreement Subject : all of properties in districted area (agreement of over half of owners) Timing : before submit proposal for RPRP Resident consultation body : resident autonomy body composition : resident representative, district public servant, outer expert Timing : before beginning of regeneration plan Steering committee : elected between resident consultation body Composition : 1 Chair, 9 or more committee Timing : After plan completion, before construction Roles : preparing Agreement, neighbourhood management Agreement write and operation Subject : Steering committee (involvement of public servant and outer expert is recommended) Timing : before construction Operation: consent of not less than two in three of all landowners.

Source: SMG (2011)

According to Bae (2014) who evaluated the effectiveness of this first pilot project area, the project had positive impacts on both developing resident’s ability for planning and promoting a regeneration programme, and building a sense of community. However, the conflict between residents and local government as well as the establishment inhibited a range of resident participation and long-term projects (Figure 3)

Figure 3. Factors that affect the capacity change and participation Intention

Rank	Positive	Negative
1	District Unit Plan Participatory neighbourhood planning	Conflict between public agencies and local government
2	District Unit Plan Participatory neighbourhood planning	Long term project period
3	Community committee for the operation of the Community Hub	Communication gap with the Establishment and confliction in the district.

Source: Bae (2014)

The benefits of participatory projects could be seen in the use of the Community Hub as a centre for senior citizens, a café, cooperative child care and starting up social enterprise, all contributed to continued community interests and participation. Unlike public led use in the past, the building is operated by a Steering Committee. In terms of the physical environment, there were significant changes, for instance, 48 new construction cases, 1 extension of a building and 7 cases of change of building use were agreed by residents themselves between 2010 and 2013. During the same period, between 2005 and 2009 there were 11 cases of building permit in total. (Bae, 2014). Thus, this change meant that the living environment was significantly improved. When it comes to economy, the impact is not clear, but as the number of restaurants and offices increased, in terms of market revitalisation, it worked.

Toward Holistic ABIs with Community

The central government enacted the Special Act on the Promotion of and Support for Urban Renewal (Urban Renewal Act) in 2013. Under the Act ‘Urban Renewal Promotion Areas’ for concentrating the resources and capabilities of the state and local governments to maximize the effectiveness of regional projects for urban regeneration could be designated. The criteria for designation are as follow:

Population index: Population has decreased continuously for more than 3 years of the past five years or decreased by more than 20% compared with the most densely populated over the past 30 years.

Industry index: The total number of businesses has decreased by more than 5% compared with the most over the last 10 years or has decreased continuously for more than 3 years over the past five years

Building index: the ratio of the building older than 20 years is not less than 50% among total building. (SMG, 2015)

In addition, an institutional framework for enabling citizen participation was adopted. This included adopting the concept of a resident consultant body and project council which did not exist in previous development Acts. The resident consultation body is a voluntary resident cooperation body to participate in an urban renewal project. The project council is a consultative body to facilitate the urban renewal project and consists of an operator for the project, administrative agencies and interested parties. Local government should endeavor to enhance residents’ sense of belongings and participation through publicity activities and educational programs to promote resident participation in both developing and implementing it. Furthermore, Urban Renewal Support Centers support the resident led Renewal Plan, including resident training, dispatch of experts, township enterprises and start-up consulting to enable residents to recognise the areas problems for themselves and reflect resident’s opinions by proposing renewal project.

Under the Urban Renewal Act, thirteen regions for urban regeneration were chosen as bellwether regions in 2014 to be completed by 2017. With substantial government funding invested during the four years. It is too early to evaluate the thirteen designated region’s plan and government support at this stage as each region is different depending on their circumstance.

Figure 4. Roles and participants under the Urban Renewal Act in 2013

Main Participants	Members	Roles
Resident consultation body	Voluntary residents	- participate in renewal plan and the performance of projects - facilitate residents’ opinion
Project council	Operator of an urban renewal project, interested parties, administrative agencies	Facilitate the implementation of renewal project
Urban Renewal Support Centers	Expert of the region, Public servant, Urban regeneration activists	Support for: - resident consultation body and project council - renewal projects planned and performed by local residents and merchants - nurturing local experts
Administrative Organs	Public official	- Overall control over and coordinates urban renewal-related work - Promote consultation between relevant departments and agencies

Source: SMG (2015)

However, it is possible to anticipate the characteristics of the projects and the programme through two previous neighbourhood regeneration plan test-bed projects conducted in Jeon-ju and Chang-won in 2011 (Figure 5). Here the government also emphasised the full participation and cooperation of diverse stakeholders such as residents, businesses, non- governmental organisations and local governments as well as holistic regeneration as a key factor for the success of the regeneration initiatives

Figure 5 Summary of test bed project in 2011

Region	Chang-won	Jeon-ju
Regional area	547,600 ㎡	1,739,000㎡
Project area	292,820㎡	330,000㎡
Feature	Over 50% of unoccupied stores Over 78% of over 20 year old buildings Deteriorated Residential Area (1216 units)	commercial stores (1313units) Deteriorated Residential Area (952 units)
Key programme	- creating cultural plaza - creating Historical and Cultural Inquiry Streets - creating green way network - ecologic stream restoration - creating water front ․	- traditional market development for tourism - revitalization of merchant organization and local community - ecologic stream restoration -making a symbolic street by unique story telling

Source: Choi (2014)

Some feature can be seen in both the test bed projects and Urban Renewal Act.

Firstly, physical environment improvements are exclusively weighted though the project used to emphasize holistic regeneration. This feature is also seen in three criteria, the population; industry and building index for the designation of Urban Renewal Promotion Areas under the Urban Renewal Act in 2013 for community participation based holistic urban regeneration. These findings suggest that South Korean ABIs recognise initiatives for renewing areas of deprivation through physical environmental improvement for economic revitalization and population regardless of conservation and clearance of the deprived area, even though South Korea has already experienced the limitation of this kind of regeneration programme.

Secondly, the level of citizen participation attempts to move to a degree of empowerment by adopting partnerships for sharing planning and decision-making responsibilities through joint policy boards such as the Resident Consultation Body and Project Council. As Arnstein(1969) argues partnership can work effectively when there is organised power in the community to hold community representative’s accountable and when the community has its own financial resources for remaining sustainable in terms of human resources and managing a time consuming process. However, three to four years was given to complete the new regeneration projects, even though all participants such as residents, developers, public sectors and interest parties were not familiar with participative regeneration. Also the consistency of financial resource was unclear. Consequently problems such as the short time-limit, an uncertain process, unfamiliar concept and lack of experiences and knowledge in both community involvement and holistic approaches could be obstacles in promoting regeneration.

Thirdly, the lack of partnership between agencies and residents - as the reasons for deprivation are complex and closely linked, the regeneration of deprived areas is a difficult task. For instance, low levels of skills for work could contribute to higher levels of unemployment, which in turn may be linked to poverty and low levels of child educational attainment as well as poorer health and crime. Thus, a range of local service delivery agencies such as health, education and the police force need to work together to bring about change in deprive areas. However, the community partnerships of South Korea is typically consisted of residents, administrative officers and local activists. This meant that the scope of the programme to deliver community benefits could be limited through a lack of specialist support and input from health, education and crime agencies and also because there is a tendency for individual service providers to work in isolation without cooperation with other agencies.

4.	Urban Regeneration in the UK

4.1	Community participation and partnership

The UK government has adopted the concept of community participation in a range of policies, both in planning and in relation to urban regenerations initiatives. However, there is confusion when using terms such as public participation, community involvement and empowerment under a growing trend towards participatory democracy. (Bailey, 2010). Participation in political terms may mean simply voting by attending council  meeting and submitting opinions about what affects peoples’ lives. In terms of urban regeneration public participation may be defined as an active process in which the general public can influence the direction and implementation of development projects rather than merely sharing the profits from project benefits (Paul, 1987). Taylor (2007) describes community involvement as one of the key factors in improving the physical and social environment through local development projects. The World Bank (2002) defined empowerment as the expansion of assets to allow people to participate in, control and negotiate with institutions that effect their lives. Schuftan (1996) argues empowerment enables individuals to understand and use their ability to control their own lives with the resources that they need to do it. Though there are various definitions, the common element is that local communities have a role to play in contributing local knowledge to decision-making which gives people a degree of autonomy and outcomes of democratic governance based on participation.

Until the early 21st century, local government had the primary role in increasing public involvement for more effective and modernised public service at a regional level. Then, the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) published a White Paper endorsing the role of local government in developing community leadership in place shaping at a local level through partnership with local communities and service providers. (Bailey, 2010).

The DCLG was promoting a more concerted and strategic approach across central government departments. Local government has always been seen as the primary agency for increasing citizen involvement as part of a broader strategy towards the modernization of public services and the creation of devolved administrations at the national, regional and city levels. The DCLG has taken the lead and to date has produced two White Papers (CLG, 2006, 2008a). The first endorsed the role of local government in developing strategies of ‘community leadership’ and ‘place-shaping’, whereby a series of formal and informal partnership arrangements would engage service providers and local communities. The second White Paper—Communities in Control—set out more detailed arrangements with 39 commitments for empowering citizens and groups. It will be the main provisions of this White Paper that will be discussed here to explore the underlying meanings of empowerment and how it is intended to promote it.

The White Paper begins by accepting that in general people feel alienated from political parties, are increasingly unwilling to vote at national and local elections, and feel they lack power in influencing elected representatives. It argues that political disengagement can be put down to ‘a sense of powerlessness on the part of most citizens that their voices are not being heard, their views not listened to,

their participation unwelcomed or their activity unrewarded’ (CLG, 2008a, p. 21). Yet research evidence suggests that people want a greater say in how the country is run and how their taxes are spent but ‘the structure and culture of politics alienates and deters them’ (CLG, 2008a, p. 21).

In response, the White Paper maintains that the answer lies in empowerment: ‘passing more and more political power to more and more people, using every practical means available, from the most modern social networking websites, to the most ancient methods of petitioning, public debates and citizens’ juries’ (CLG, 2008a, p. 21). It is argued that community empowerment brings real benefits to the

individual as well as supporting more cohesive and integrated communities, helps revive civic society and local democracy, drives forward improvements in service delivery, and enables civic  organizations and social enterprises to promote social change.

A number of new legislative and administrative changes are proposed. The first is to give local authorities a ‘duty to promote democracy’ through a variety of measures to improve communications and engagement of specific groups. ‘We will empower local councils to present themselves as democratic centres, with a new culture which sees democratic politics as respected, recognised and valued’ (CLG, 2008a, p. 24).

The second will extend the ‘duty to involve’ beyond local authorities to 14 other public-sector agencies that provide services at the local level, including the police, the Environment Agency and the Homes and Communities Agency. This power came into effect in April 2009 and is designed to ‘embed a culture of engagement and empowerment. This means that authorities consider ...  the possibilities for provision of information to, consultation with and involvement of representatives

of local persons across all authority functions’ (CLG, 2008b, p. 19; original emphasis). The Guidance notes that representatives of local persons refers not just to local residents but also includes those who work or study in the area, visitors, service users, local third-sector groups, businesses, parish councils and anyone else likely to be interested or affected. Authorities are required to consider how

representatives of local persons can: influence or directly participate in decision-making;

provide feedback on decisions, services, policies and outcomes; be

involved in the commissioning of services; contribute to the delivery of services; contribute to the scrutiny and improvement of the quality of services (CLG, 2008a, pp. 21 – 22).

Recent legislation has established a number of mechanisms for setting out strategic plans for planning and regeneration at the local level. These include the Sustainable Community Strategy, the Local Area Agreement and, for planning purposes, the Local Development Framework. These cannot be discussed in any detail here but all include requirements to consult and involve local interests. In

relation to the Sustainable Community Strategy, the Guidance requires each local authority to establish a panel for consultation purposes and requires the inclusion of ‘persons from under-represented groups’. Each local authority is required to consult widely on ‘which communities of interest may be underrepresented in civic and political activity, in particular those who are hardest to reach, and invite people who are representative of these communities to join the panel’ (CLG, 2008a, p. 54). This is the first time that the need to include ‘hard-to-reach’ groups has been identified in central government guidance. Other parts of the White Paper address ways in which local authorities can promote a more active citizenship through, for example, volunteering, gaining access to information, influencing and challenging decision-making, standing for office and setting up third-sector

organizations, such as voluntary associations, trusts and social enterprises.

The White Paper contains many small-scale changes addressing a wide range of issues concerning local government and the delivery of local services, but do these changes promote a genuine transfer of power

Understanding Community Empowerment in Urban Regeneration

to which groups and interests? At the same time, it is worth identifying those aspects of ‘empowerment’ that are not discussed. The overriding question is what are the underlying aims and objectives we can deduce from the White Paper and do they provide the foundations for a new form of participatory democracy which genuinely empowers local communities?

The first point to note is that the White Paper introduces a large array of new duties and responsibilities, new programmes, enhancements to existing practices and new ideas to be tested that relate to multi-level governance and the delivery of local services. At the same time, and possibly to off-set criticism that the national level is overlooked, the Ministry of Justice issued its own discussion document entitled A National Framework for Greater Citizen Engagement (Ministry of

Justice, 2008). One of the positive features of the White Paper is that it contains multiple objectives designed to create stronger links between civil society and government by the requirement of local government and other agencies to inform, consult and engage citizens. This raises the question as to whether these changes add up to a comprehensive programme of change or are merely piecemeal changes that are fundamentally designed to make the present system of representative

democracy work more effectively. The duty to promote democracy and the duty to involve may simply represent top-down directions that are largely cosmetic if authorities only implement the letter of the law or if citizens are unwilling or unable to engage fully in the process.

This leads on to the nature of the governance systems with which citizens are being encouraged to engage. The White Paper fails to address the extreme complexity of many of the governance systems currently operating at the local level where overlapping partnerships and administrative arrangements are designed to manage and deliver a wide variety of strategies and plans. Reference has already been made to Sustainable Community Strategies, Local Strategic Partnerships, Local Area Agreements and Local Development Frameworks. Each

has different powers and procedures to consult and engage local citizens and organizations, and each has a different membership where some key roles may be overlapping. The extent to which community empowerment can be achieved in any of these fora needs to be tested empirically. Furthermore, a fundamental weakness of the guidance is the lack of definition of the roles of members of local

communities: Are they selected or elected onto these fora or panels because of their individual knowledge or as representatives of wider communities, which in turn may be divided by sectional interests? Government rarely acknowledges that local communities may reflect very different viewpoints on local issues reflecting differences of age, housing tenure or ethnic origin, for example, and instead only seeks to ensure that ‘persons of from under represented groups’ are included.

As well as uncertainties about the roles of community representatives, the bigger issue concerns the power relationships between different stakeholders. The guidance is silent on this issue since the assumption appears to be that all those involved are of equal standing and have equal power and influence in determining strategies. Research tends to suggest that many of these fora are ‘invited spaces’ where members of local communities are entering a new and unfamiliar bureaucratic environment in which the technical dialogue may be unfamiliar and intimidating. Relatively inexperienced community representatives may also be confronting seasoned politicians and senior officers with excellent professional skills. Barnes et al. (2008) have identified some of the disadvantages of citizen-centred governance in that it often lacks transparency and accountability. Those not directly involved are often unaware of, or not widely consulted about, decisions made in their name. Again, there is no further clarification of these issues in the guidance discussed here.

A further aspect of power relations is the circumscribed boundaries of what can and cannot be discussed in these fora. Agendas are largely set by the more powerful stakeholders, such as the local authority, and pressures of time and the need to make decisions mean that the broader issues of deprivation, unemployment and social exclusion arising from a neo-liberal understanding of globalization are often

avoided. Is it reasonable to expect a local community to be empowered when much stronger, external forces creating inequalities and disadvantage are not addressed?

Finally, the use of terms such as to inform, engage and empower imply very different degrees of change in current governance systems. There is no guidance on what the ultimate objective should be. The White Paper sees empowerment as being about ‘passing more and more political power to more and more people but there is little discussion about how this might be achieved. Overall, the White Paper proposes many minor reforms that will assist many individuals and organizations in exerting greater influence over local agencies. Yet these reforms will operate at many different levels and will help promote all five core objectives identified above.

The underlying premise of the Whiter Paper is that community empowerment strongly contributes to integrate communities, support service delivery and revive civic society to promote social change. In recent central government guidance, representatives of local community refers not just to community residents but also includes anyone who represents the local area for example, workers, visitors, local NGOs and businesses (CLG, 2008a), so that authorities are now required to consider how wider representation can be involved in decision-making for the delivery of services, as well as widening representation to include hard to reach groups who are part of the community.

As described above, the government’s approach toward community empowerment deals with a range of issues addressing the role of local government and agencies. However, there is uncertainty about the role of local community representation. As urban policies dealing with social exclusion and deprivation are situated at the intersection of a number of policies, participation can be seen specifically in urban regeneration initiatives (Ghose, 2005), and local peoples’ involvement in local area regeneration initiatives has become an accepted norm. Alongside this partnerships between public and private sector for addressing local issues have come to be seen as a panacea (Dhillon, 2007). In programmes such as the New Deal for Communities, active local residents are quite used to being invited to join partnerships and having (in theory) similar powers to other stake-holders.

community representatives are either co-opted or elected onto management boards or partnerships, such as with the New Deal for

Communities programme and local strategic partnerships, where disputes may arise about the strategy or mode of delivery, but not about the fundamental purpose of the programme. In this context, residents are often elected or invited to sit on boards and partnerships as equal members to other stakeholders and, as in the example of New Deal for Communities, may be in the majority. Extending from this is the broader concept of co-production, which combines both improvements to service delivery and a degree of empowerment: (Bailey, 2010)

The idea is that, by working alongside the people they are supporting,

public services can dramatically increase their resources, extend their

reach, radically transform the way they operate and be much more

effective. Co-production makes strengthening the core economy of

neighbourhood and family the central task of all public services. (Boyle

& Harris, 2009, p. 14)

In this rapidly developing field the common theme is that residents and service users should have an input into decisions affecting the quality of their lives. The extent to which power and authority should be or is transferred to these interest groups is rarely made explicit. (Bailey, 2010)

In this way communities can gain some power over decision making. In terms of individuals, residents may acquire new skills and power to deal with local issues. As Sullivan et al. (2004) described, this is a balance of power between authorities and communities as well as a new steering mechanism. However, in reality the power of the state has not declined because government is still the key source of funding for local initiatives.

4.2 Area Based Regeneration

For decades, UK governments have addressed problems associated with urban deprivation. From the mid-1960s through to the end of the 1990s, both Conservative and Labour governments introduced programmes and set up initiatives to improve physical, social and economic conditions evident within most UK cities though the point of emphasis was different depending on powers (Beatty, 2010).

The Conservative government, elected in 1979 when confronted with declining traditional industries and the increasing cost of state expenditure on welfare, believed that the state could no longer be the leading actor in the redevelopment of cities. This led to large cuts in public spending and reducing the power of local authorities. Central government encouraged the private sector to participate and invest in development, such as the London Docklands development project led by the Urban Development Corporation (UDCs). Organisations were set up by central government to enable rapid renewal within declined cities led by the private sector replacing local authorities. (Haughton, 1999).

While, Jones and Evans (2013) argue this reform means a gradual extension of the powers of central government including financial resources, the private sector took over urban re-development without public sector intervention. Researchers (Brownill and Darke, 1998; Duffy and Hutchinson, 1997) describe how the Conservative government’s approach to regeneration switched the focus back to property-led rather than area-based initiatives as most opportunities were given to the private sector to contribute to urban renewal for the creation of economic prosperity, without addressing social and economic interactions affected by those development.

Actually, those arguments cannot be denied as from the initial years of the Conservative government, until early 1990s, the private sector emphasis prevailed reflecting an ideological attachment to the free market. Although economically successful in themselves, other considerations such as social needs were neglected (Jones and Evans. 2013). The evident difficulties of coordination within any regeneration area eventually led to new government initiatives under the John Major administration. During the 1990s, urban policy moved away from focusing on property regeneration to an emphasis on the needs of disadvantaged people at the local level. In the light of determining the amount of funding to local authorities to plan and implement urban re-development project, a new principle of the 1990’s Conservative’s reform was competitive and area based initiatives with partnerships. (Croeley et al. 2012).

City Challenge announced in 1991 and the subsequent Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) launched in 1994 were flagship programmes showing the feature. The City Challenge was the first competition based fund for obtaining funding from central government. It was a five year programme carried out in partnership with the public, private and community sectors to deliver sustained area regeneration. (Ball-Petsimeris, 2004) and also encouraged various grant regimes to put together plans and submit bids to central government for funds to regenerate declined areas through physical, social and economic action in an integrated fashion. Tyler (2007) describe this initiative as:

“The first real attempts at seeking to bring about holistic regeneration in the local areas”

The City Challenge regarded as the foundation for the implementation of the Single Regeneration Budget (1994) designed to bring together and streamline a variety of existing separate programmes from several government departments, with the idea of reducing complexity and creating a system to provide resources to support urban regeneration initiatives carried out by local partnerships. (Croeley et al, 2012).

As the SRB re-packaged a number of different programs and emphasised the partnership model of delivery for better regeneration outcomes, the projects which won the funding competition could receive substantial funding. Thus, the SRB could have significant advantages for taking an holistic approach to resolving complex problems in an area.

Despite its achievement, however, the SRB funding also arouse issues.

One of the them was Governance. the introduction of the SRB emphasized the clear transfer of power from Central government to local communities. In certain respective, it could be claimed that the extent of partnership working on regeneration issues stimulated by the SRB was successful and without precedent. However, the fact that most funding was allocated through competition abilities rather than needs where experiencing serious deprivation could be regarded as a problem. In deed, the key role in SRB fund bid was by local authorities in successful bids. In the light of involvement, local authority, Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), which are created in 1989 to attract private sector involvement and promote an enterprise in the field of economic development, and private sector involvement was kept at a high level which figure was over 80 per cent. On the other hand, community and voluntary sector were accounted for only 60 per cent. This showed that partners who are typically local authorities tended to lead the form and content of bids following their needs. Therefore, local regeneration partnerships have often been used as a way to achieve local authority’s strategy. (Mawson, 1999). In other words, criticism about limited the impact of SRB has continued, because local resident engagement was limited, which means those regeneration initiatives regarded local people as just recipient rather than partner for planning and delivering programme. (Lawless, 2004). This caused limitations in identifying local needs and was ineffective in addressing that as well as the making sustainability difficult because local residents’ lacked of sense of ownership about government led schemes.

Another issues was about resource. Before the introduction of SRB, regeneration fund were concentrated on the Urban Priority Areas of 57 region, whereas under the SRB initiative at least 329 local authority districts were chosen as a recipient for the first three rounds. Moreover, the amount of resource for the SRB fund schemes was very small. This means that the SRB initiative tried to achieve too much in too many places without enough resources available to address the worst problems in deprived areas over the country (Nevin et al., 1997).

In terms of resource allocation, the SRB also raised concern about decreased allocation in other part of investment and housing investment could be a representative as a lot of the objectives of holistic regeneration initiatives such as environmental improvement, public health and poverty could be achieved without continuous housing provision or refurbishment for residence stability. Then, it was commonly stated that housing made a loss in the SRB initiative. this claim could be underpinned by various statistics. for example, the ratio of resources allocated to housing projects declined and housing outputs decreased continuously. More precisely, there was no housing programme in the three quarters of approved schemes and fewer than 58,000 dewellings were provided in round three which was substantially below before SRB initiative.(Mawson, 1999).

Policy issues was also important. While the property led regeneration was prosperous in the 1980s, human resource or people related development took priority over investment of the SRB initiative. According to a survey conducted by local authorities in 1998, for instance, over forty per cent of respondents were focusing on enhancing education and skills of local people, where the figure was only 25 per cent in encouraging local competitiveness and economic development. (Mawson, 1999).

4.3 Innovation during New Labour period and evaluation

In 1997 a Labour government came to power after almost 20 years of Conservative government. There were high expectations that this change would bring a transformation in the nature of urban governance but the Conservative administration’s main regeneration policies such as SRB were retained for years. (Jones and Evans, 2013).

Ultimately, due to criticism of the existing area based approach for its lack of strategic focus (House of Commons, 2003) and growing awareness of social exclusion, new initiative such as the New Deal for Communities regeneration programme aimed to ‘close the gap’ between the most deprived areas and the rest of the country (Brownill, 2007). Significant changes in governance and delivery mechanisms occurred together with increased emphasis on the regional level scale for regeneration activities. This resulted in the establishment of Regional Development Agencies (DETR, 1997) alongside a new funding stream emphasizing flexibility and autonomy for RDAs called the ‘single-pot’ in 2001 (DTLR, 2001a and b) replacing SRB. As outlined above, urban policy under New Labour embarked on an attempt to reduce regional and local disparities based on longer time spans and increased resources compared to previous initiatives, which were characterised by limited resources for a pre-determined period of less than 5 years. However, despite a longer period of intervention (more than previous ABIs), it has been argued that these policies did not work effectively in terms of outcomes, resulting in an emerging new agenda as well as end of ABIs. (Croeley et al, 2012).

The following discussion will consider further evidence behind claims made about effectiveness, focusing on one flagship policy responses of the era, The New Deal for Communities (NDCs) through existing evaluation papers and related statistics.

4.4 The New Deal for Communities Programme

The Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) was set up in 1997 with the aim of developing coordinated policies to address social exclusion, it then published a report criticising urban policy of the 1980s for its narrow overemphasis on property-focused regeneration. It underlined the lack of co-ordination between central and local authorities as well as co-operation amongst local agencies and communities. The report highlighted a more holistic approach within neighbourhoods, as well as a greater emphasis on strengthening partnerships and community involvement in the process of planning and implementing local regeneration. With these objectives the government launched the NDC programme in 2001 three years after it was announced in 1998 as part of the government's National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (Croeley et al., 2012). The Programme was sponsored by the Department of Environment and Transport for the Regions (DTER).

Thirty nine NDC Partnerships were selected across England consisting of about 9,400 people a local NDC partnership. Ten were in London, two in Birmingham and the rest across England. (Lawless et al, 2010). The selection of the areas proceeded in two phases. Seventeen Partnerships were announced in 1998 and a further twenty two schemes a year later. Each area received approximately £50m funding, about ￡2 billion in total, of government investment for a 10 year Delivery Plan. This level of funding, more than any previous urban regeneration programme, allowed the programme to be sustainable (Muscat, 2010)

The thirty nine areas were selected by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister based on the criteria of the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) including socio-demographic indicators such as Employment deprivation, Income deprivation, Health deprivation and disability, Education, skills and training deprivation, Crime, Living environment deprivation as well as a regional quota system. (DCLG, 2015).

Figure 6 Allocation for ten-year NDC funding

	Region	Government (number)
1	Hartlepool - West Central Hartlepool Middlesbrough - West Middlesbrough Newcastle - West Gate Sunderland - East End and Hendon	North East (4)
2	Knowsley - Huyton Liverpool - Kensington Manchester - Beswick & Openshaw Oldham - Hathershaw and Fitton Hill Rochdale - Heywood Salford - Charlestown & Lower Kersal	North West (6)
3	Bradford - Little Horton, Marshfield and West Bowling Doncaster - Central Doncaster Hull - Preston Road Sheffield - Burngreave	Yorkshire and the Humber (4)
4	Derby - Derwent Leicester - Braunstone Nottingham - Radford and Hyson Green	East Midlands (3)
5	Birmingham - Aston Birmingham - Kings Norton Coventry - Wood End, Henley Green and Manor Farm Sandwell - Greets Green Walsall - Blakenall Wolverhampton - All Saints and Blakenhall	West Midlands (6)
6	Luton - Marsh Farm Norwich - North Earlham, Larkham and Marlpit	East of England (2)
7	Brighton - East Brighton 4 Southampton - Thornhill	South East (2)
8	Bristol - Barton Hill Plymouth - Devonport	South West (2)
9	Brent - South Kilburn Hackney - Shoreditch Hammersmith & Fulham - North Fulham Haringey - Seven Sisters Islington - Finsbury Lambeth - Clapham Park Lewisham - New Cross Gate Newham - West Ham and Plaistow Southwark - Aylesbury Estate Tower Hamlets - Ocean Estate	London (10)

Source : NAO (2004)

Organising Partnerships

The government invited community partnerships to prepare proposals for deprived neighbourhoods. Both local authorities and public service provider were involved in this process. The process was in two phases: (NAO, 2004)

Phase one - Partnership formation. The partnership consists of local residents, local organisations, local authorities and public agencies. Outline proposals for regeneration were suggested and then submitted to central government.

Phase two - Partnership selection. Central government assessed outline proposals based on national criteria score across England, then select as NDC partnership.

Each NDC employed around fifteen dedicated staff to assist their schemes, and was required to form a board of directors including a Chief Executive and delivery teams to designate an 'Accountable Body', normally the local authority, for financial management and oversight of each NDC partnership. The Partnership Boards comprised agency and community representatives. In terms of resident participation, local residents consisted of 50% or more of the boards in most partnerships and over 80% in 2008 (CLG, 2009c). Community involvement was at the centre of the programme in all stages of the regeneration process from the initial bid to securing funding. This feature is reflected in expenditure. For instance, the amount of money that the NDC partnership spent for enhancing the involvement and participation of local residents was over 18% of total expenditure between 1999 and 2008 (CLG, 2010c). Thus, NDC partnership could be one of the representative examples of efforts to engagement and empowerment of residents.

Partnerships worked closely with other delivery agencies, and had a significant degree of freedom in addressing the problems of their areas, leading to a wide range of activities in their neighbourhood. Roles and responsibilities of the main partners to the NDC are detailed below in Figure 7

The role of partnership was to devise and implement their long term strategies to achieve improvement by improving six themes outcomes (Muscat, 2010). Three of these are place based: Crime - reducing the incidence of crime, Community - enhancing a sense of community, Housing and the Physical Environment - improving local housing stock and the local environment, and three ‘people based: Education - improving residents' skills and educational attainment, Health - introducing healthy living initiatives or enhancing access to health services, Worklessness - helping people to compete in the workforce. (Beatty et al., 2011)

Figure 7. Roles and responsibilities of the main participants

Main Participants	Roles	Responsibilities
NDC Chief Executive	Advising Board and, development and management of projects
NDC Chariperson	Elected by the community
Community representatives	To represent the views and opinions of the NDC community on the Board	Identifying local needs, developing strategies, reporting to the Board and steering these projects.
Government Office	Supervision and monitoring the NDC programme	Agreeing partnership’s strategies and annual funding to the partnerships; Monitoring and assessing projects.
NDC Partnership Board	Coordinating and managing actions in the Partnership community	Identifying community needs; - Developing annual development strategy with Government Office and assisting Accountable Body - manage and account for the funds
Main local service delivery agencies (Accountable Body, e.g. Police Force, Job Centre)	Attend working groups and assist in developing strategies and delivering of projects by advice.	Now always, but the NDC Partnerships work with delivery agencies to: ■ Increase the existing services already supplied by the agencies ■ Implement projects planned by the agency and NDC partnership

Source: (NAO, 2004)

According to NAO (2004) there are characteristics in successful partnerships identified four key stages as follows;

The first stage is to understand the problems of local people and to involve them in the process of developing plans for their local area and building the NDC partnership. Namely, it is community engagement under the belief that community residents can play in changing their local area.

The risks of failing to do this well are that funds are directed to areas that do not benefit local residents and do not deliver services to those in greatest need. The result of analysis of the programme, however, showed that about eleven per cent of residents in NDC area have actively engaged in partnership. The figure increased significantly compare to previous regeneration initiatives such as SRB and other Western country’s programme for regeneration. However, community consultation was not an easy task and sometimes delayed and sometimes replaced tangible results in some partnership. Thus, lots of money was allocated to the first three years of the programme (about £800, 40% of the overall £2bn) before partnerships had drawn up their plans.

NDC partnerships should establish well orgarnized operating processes which involve shaping an organisational structure, bringing together a board of directors and a delivery team and adhering to sound financial management processes. Well orgarnized operating processes established by partnerships are important for many reasons.

Good decision-making procedures can ensure effective allocation of limited resources of NDC projects. Clear 'conflict-of-interest' declarations and financial reporting systems help to explain responsibility to community members in NDC partnership work. Effective communications adopted by partnership can help to share in the progress of the programme and to build support for later years. When NDC partnerships failed to establish effective and well orgarnized operating procedures resources could not be used for the purposes intended. There are something in commoin in poorer operating processes, there had been ;

- Project delays caused by lengthy discussions to clarify project approval criteria

- Cynicism within communities that fair and proper processes were not being applied

- The disengagement of potential delivery partners who were wary of decision-making processes

- The risk that monies were not being spent well.

(NAO, 2004)

Thus, during the course of the NDC programme, particularly in these early years, the goverment has focused on striking a balance between direct intervention, and working with their accountable bodies and regional government offices to support weaker NDC partnerships in the operation of individual NDC partnerships.

For NDC partnerships to focus on delivering their plan they

need to work with partners by forming and maintaining good relations with a range of partners such as delivery agents, national and local bodies. Some of these bodies will help to steer progress, while others will be funded to deliver on behalf of the NDC partnership. If NDC partnerships reluctant or avoid to consult and work with partner bodies, there could be risks that working against existing local area initiatives or failing to see opportunities for more efficient working arrangements with partner organisations. However, tensions between NDC partnerships and local authorities caused by ambiguous role of accountable body, which in the majority of NDC partnerships are commonly reported. Thus, the role of the regional government as a facilitator has been important and has evolved during the course of the programme from the early stages of community consultation to the establishment of boards by providing direction and an indication of what it should involve.

Finally, as NDC partnerships move into delivery phase, they need to focus on delivery and sustainability so that projects are designed with long term benefits. Without designing sustainability into projects, the benefits of the programme may only live as long as the NDC partnerships that fund them. Thus, lessons from successful case of NDC partnerships should be collected and shared by national evaluation from early stage because of the difference of experience and capacity of community led initiatives between partnerships and circumstance.

Figure 8 Ingredient of success

National Evaluation of NDC Programme

DCLG has used the degree of change from the beginning of the program as a basis for evaluating the impact of NDC. This evaluation was based on household surveys, and thirty-six indicators were used in the evaluation, with people and place related outcomes. (DCLG, 2015). These indicators provided data reflecting changes in all NDC areas which could address research questions.

Evidence showed that the NDCs did contribute to the positive changes across partnerships. Table 1 presents the change in twenty-four of the thirty-six indicators for national benchmark data between 2002 and 2008. Most indicators (except two – receiving benefit, no exercise - which showed negative change) showed an improvement across indicators in NDC areas as a whole. This result shows how NDC areas have been transformed positively in those six years.

In terms of narrowing the gap between the national average and NDC areas, both national benchmark and other deprived areas could be used to evaluate the achievement. (DCLG, 2010a). The national benchmark uses twenty-four of the thirty-six indicators, and only six of these were more improved by more areas than the NDC ones. Interestingly, three of the six are around the theme of community (e.g. quality of life and influencing decision-making affecting the local area). Thus, the NDC could be regarded as working in terms of closing gaps between communities.

However, when the outcomes are compared to other deprived localities (the comparator), the benefits of NDCs can be questioned (Table 1). As the comparator areas are in the same local authorities with each NDC partnership, this could be the most effective benchmark in comparing change. (DCLG, 2010a). The comparator areas showed more improvement than NDC areas for 13 indicators. Notably, bearing in mind that the community was intended to be at the heart of any NDC partnership, community indicators should show more progress, but this did not occur. This outcome was also apparent in the education sector. Education attainment evaluated by English level, was higher in comparator areas than in the NDC average. It seems that both NDC areas and comparator areas show similar patterns of change whether positive or not, and NDC areas do not always achieve more change than other deprived areas though the gap is not significant.

Overall, the holistic approaches of the NDC for community regeneration worked, especially on place-related issues rather than people-related indicators. According to DCLG (2010a), there are a number of reasons why place-related initiatives showed more achievement. One reason is around the number of people who can benefit from initiatives. More specifically, whilst a large number of people could not be affected or benefited by most people related initiatives such as job training, employment supports and health programs, more residents could benefit from place-related initiatives such as physical environment improvement schemes. As people want to influence decision making process affecting their life (CLG, 2008b), place-related interventions provide more opportunities for community involvement, resulting in picking up more positive perception of local residents and this is shown in the household survey.

Secondly, place-related interventions can be more sustainable after regeneration schemes are finished than people-related interventions. Though NDC programme sustained for a longer time than all previous ABIs programme, it finished after ten years. Thus, the NDC partnership should consider how the outcomes of intervention should be sustained in community and neighbourhood for a lasting impact. (CLG, 2009). However, people-related interventions cannot be guaranteed success because outcomes such as worklessness may be strongly affected by external economic circumstances. Furthermore, supporting disadvantaged people directly to achieve better individual outcomes could increase the possibility of the mobility of people who benefited. As people build skills and acquire qualifications for better jobs, they may try to move to better places to live and get those jobs. It seems possible that this could make partnerships hesitate to focus on people-related initiatives, leading to them spending less resources on these.

Ultimately, though NDC partnerships intended to improve deprived areas with holistic approaches, many of them emphasized on place-related interventions (DCLG, 2010b). This is reflected in spending percentage by outcomes (Figure 9.). The three place related outcomes: HPE, Crime and Community account for three-fifths of all spends between 2000 and 2008.

According to national evaluation, Birmingham-Aston and Kings Norton ranked the highest and lowest across all thirty-nine NDC partnership (Beatty et al., 2011). In the next section those two Birmingham NDC areas will be studied to find out the cause of the differences.

Figure 9 NDC spend percentage by outcomes between 2000 and 2008

Source: DCLG (2010, b)

Table 1. Percentage point change 2002-2008

People related Indicator	Percentage Point Change 2002-2008
	NDC area	Highest Change (B_ Aston)	Lowest Change (B_ Kings Norton)	Comparator area	National Benchmark
Education
Key Stage 2 English, level 4	11.2	9.1	-9.1	13.3	7
Key Stage 3 English, level 5	11.7	20.8	13.7	12.1	7
Key Stage 4, five or more GCSEs at A* to C	22.2	22.2	36.7	24.3	15
No qualifications	-4.7	-10.6	0.1	-3.3	-3
Taken part in educ./training in the past year	1.8	7.4	4.5	-2.3	-
Need to improve basic skills	-0.1	7.4	6.9	-2.0	-4
Worklessness and finance
Unemployment rate	-0.7	0.5	1.7	-0.7	0
Work limiting illness rate	-1.5	-2.6	-1.4	-1.3	0
In employment	2.9	12.2	-5.4	0.7	0
Gross household income below £200 per week	-11.4	-19.3	-12.2	-10.7	-4
Receive benefits	2.4	-10.9	5.0	2.4	-
Workless household	-3.7	-6.2	-2.4	-2.6	-
Health
Do no exercise for 20 minutes or more	1.6	-5.3	1.0	0.4	-2
Smoke cigarettes	-4.6	3.0	-2.1	-2.5	-4
Feel own health not good	-4.0	-6.6	-1.9	-3.3	-2
SF36 mental health index, high score	3.9	9.4	8.1	-2.7	-
Health somewhat/much worse than one year ago	-1.7	-7.1	-3.7	1.1	5
Very/fairly satisfied with family doctor/GP	1.3	2.3	2.1	2.6	0
Place related Indicator	Percentage Point Change 2002-2008
	NDC area	Highest Change (B_ Aston)	Lowest Change (B_ Kings Norton)	Comparator area	National Benchmark
Crime
Feel a bit/very unsafe after dark	-12.4	-17.8	-6.3	-9.1	-2
Been a victim of burglary in last year	-3.0	-4.4	-1.7	-2.1	-1
Been a victim of criminal damage in last year	-2.6	-2.5	0.8	-0.5	-
Been a victim of any crime in last year	-6.3	-9.4	1.9	-2.8	-
Lawlessness and dereliction index, high score	-18.3	-17.4	-8.7	-9.4	-
Fear of crime index, high score	-14.1	-10.3	-12.8	-14.9	-
Housing and the physical environment
Trapped	0.0	-0.8	4.3	0.7	-
Very/fairly satisfied with area	13.4	13.2	7.2	7.8	-1
Want to move	0.2	2.1	10.0	-1.1	-3
Very/fairly satisfied with accommodation	2.1	0.5	-4.0	2.0	-1
Area got much/slightly better in past two years	17.8	21.8	9.5	11.3	0
Problems with environment index, high score	-10.1	-11.0	-12.2	-7.2	-
Community
Feel part of the community a great deal/a fair amount	9.6	8.6	-4.5	11.2	8
Neighbours look out for each other	2.0	9.6	-1.9	1.5	5
NDC improved area a great deal/a fair amount	27.1	39.7	20.4	n/a
Quality of life very/fairly good	3.5	9.1	0.5	5.0	5
Can influence decisions that affect local area	2.1	3.2	4.8	2.4	5
Involved in NDC activity	5.6	2.4	8.6	n/a	-

Source: Evaluation Technical Report

4.5 The Birmingham Experience

Kings Norton Three Estates

Overview

The NDC area, the Three Estates, consists of three council estates which are Pool Farm, Primrose and Hawkesley which were built in the 1950s and 1970s. The Three Estates are located on the south east edge of Birmingham approximately six miles from the city centre and consist of around 4,000 properties and 10,000 residents who are mainly white. The ratio of social rented housing which was initially built for people affected by inner city clearance programmes and for employers in south Birmingham such as Cadburys factory at Bournville and car manufacturing at Longbridge. The decline of the manufacturing industry dramatically affected out of town estates like Kings Norton. (Shared Intelligence, 2009). In 2000 the area was listed in the top 20% of the most deprived areas in England with facing a wide range of problems such as high no qualification, long term illnessness and high rate of worklessness of working ages. In terms of ethnical diversity, most population (over 90%) was white British as Figure 11. Furthermore, as this area had never been the subject of any previous ABIs, levels of community participation was also low. (Shared Intelligence, 2009)

NDC partnership

The bid for funding and initial delivery plan were developed by an Interim

Partnership Group, which included a range of residents, Birmingham

Voluntary Services Council (BVSC), Birmingham City Council and some other local partners. The Interim Partnership Group was incorporated as the Kings Norton 3 Estates Community Development Trust (CDT) in June 2001. The CDT was designed to act as the “delivery agent” for the NDC’s projects and activities, and was made up of 23 members: 12 elected local residents and 11 community partners with expertise in different themes.

Like the majority of NDC partnerships, the Kings Norton NDC had to work through a number of complex partnership relationship issues as it got itself up and running. At the start of the programme, Birmingham Voluntary Services Council (BVSC) was the NDC’s Accountable Body. At the request of BVSC, alternative arrangements for the Accountable Body function were examined. The City Council supported the recruitment process and the appointment of Castle Vale Housing Action Trust in the role. However, central government later advised that the Housing Action Trust did not have the powers to accept the role and NDC funding required the City Council to act as the Accountable Body. From 2002, the NDC introduced a new structure, with a Neighbourhood Manager and four Theme Groups led by Theme Leads / Co-ordinators, covering Housing and the Built Environment; Community Safety; Education,

Employment and Lifelong Learning; and Health and Lifestyle. The purpose of the Theme Groups and Leads was to bring service providers together to develop solutions to problems caused by gaps or weaknesses in services. The NDC also established the Stakeholders Forum, a wider grouping of local service providers across the themes.

The Theme Groups were re-structured in 2005, to encourage a greater focus on strategic over operational issues. The evaluation of the Neighbourhood Management Project which had initiated the Theme Groups found that they had been “taking on more formal responsibilities for the delivery of NDC activity, rather than the strategic bodies they were intended to be”. Toward the end of the programme, the role of the Theme Groups was reviewed, in light of the shift toward succession planning. The NDC aligned itself with the work and objectives of the city-wide LAA and the Northfield Constituency Partnership

Aston Pride

Overview

The Aston Pride NDC area is on the northwest side of Birmingham City Centre. The area contains a mix of residential and industrial areas and has a relatively higher rate of young people compared to both Birmingham and nationally. The estate is ethnically diverse; comprising 20% white with a majority of Asian/Asian British accounting for over 55% compared to about 20% in Birmingham as a whole. The economy of Aston was strongly depended on manufacturing industry like other inner city area in Birmingham, so that when the manufacturing industry faced sharp decline, Aston was also significantly affected economically. The number of jobs, for instance, fell by half between 1991 and 2001. (BCC, 2011). In 2000, over 45% of working age residents were inactive economically, almost twice both national (22%) and Birmingham (25%) average, respectively. In terms of education, below 60% of primary school students in Aston met the required English level compared with a 70% of Birmingham (Crowley et al., 2012). This area also suffered from  noise and pollution, with major roads crossing the area, dividing and acting as physical barriers between its neighbourhoods. Moreover, a range of factors associated with the local economy, housing, infrastructure and the historic pattern of land use were tending to concentrate on economic and social deprivation in Aston.(BCC, 2011). Thus, there was an pressing need for a regeneration initiative that would help to turn the area around that built on the substantial assets of this area and local people.

NDC partnership

The Aston Pride Partnership was incorporated as a Company, limited

by guarantee, in October 2001 with 28 Board members, 20 of whom were registered as Directors. Community representatives were nominated by the five Neighbourhood Forums in the area. Fundamental tensions quickly arose within the Partnership (and between the Partnership and Birmingham City Council acting as the Accountable Body), because of conflicts between the NDC policy objective for Partnerships to be “community led” and the Treasury regulatory framework for public funding.

The community representatives’ assumption that “community led” meant “community ownership”, coupled with the fact that they felt that it was they who actually “won” the bid, was a dangerous misconception that created many issues.

Community representatives nominated through local Neighbourhood Forums also created a conflict of interest that proved divisive. The Board of the Aston Pride Partnership became “plagued with mistrust and hostility that eventually left it dysfunctional and ineffective, despite the obvious commitment and passion of individual members. Members of the Board collectively lacked the experience, skills and understanding necessary for the effective leadership and direction of a complex ￡54m 10-year regeneration Programme.” In addition, the creation of Aston Pride Partnership Ltd as a Company Limited by Guarantee proved a major distraction for the Partnership from its key task of delivering benefits to the residents of Aston.

In April 2003, the then Secretary of State for Regeneration, Tony McNulty, asked that Government Office for the West Midlands commission a review of the constitution and governance of the Partnership. This independent review recommended an innovative approach, which placed a firm emphasis on the role of the Partnership as a regeneration delivery body and built a number of key community participation and community development principles into its structure.

It proposed an unincorporated body, streamlined to 17:9 community members, 2 Council members, 5 agency members and an independent Chair. The idea of elected community members, to five themes, placed the emphasis back on what the Partnership was there to deliver rather

than who should have a seat at the table.

The potential ‘pairing’ of elected community members and nominated agency members introduced a reciprocal mentoring principle which could strengthen both the skills base in the Partnership and the role of the

Theme Groups. As a result of this review, a new Partnership was established, led by Simon Topman, a local businessman, as the Independent Chair.

Arrangements were also put in place for greater involvement of statutory agencies. This helped ensure necessary strategic support and that additional resources could be ‘brought to the table’ as well as helping to establish greater trust and closer working relations with resident representatives.

One of the government’s key requirements for the new Partnership was that there should be direct elections for community representatives on the Delivery Partnership Board.

The Electoral Reform Ballot Service was asked to manage the process of community elections, which were held in June 2003. 17 nominations were received for 5 positions on the Board. 10,301 ballot papers were distributed to residents in the area and 42% of these were returned; which, due to the size of the electorate, was the largest number

of people voting in any New Deal for Communities election.

The 2007/08 Governance Review recommended a move away from a process of direct elections for Community Members towards an application and selection process. This was to ensure a more open and transparent process in view of the nature of community politics in the area and to ensure a more representative range of membership on the Board.

The Aston Pride (NDC) Delivery Partnership Board was therefore established in 2003 as an unincorporated body to act as the delivery vehicle for the Programme. It’s Governance Directory, (which was reviewed and revised during 2007/08), included: Terms of Reference for the Board and Theme groups; Code of Conduct; Declaration of Interests; Board Member Roles and Responsibilities and delegated authorities

The Partnership Board’s principal role was to concentrate on delivery.

It did this by implementing the Delivery Plan and ascertaining the best route to sustainable regeneration for the Aston Pride NDC area, so that conditions of disadvantage could be overcome.

The new Partnership was also given delegated authority from Government to approve projects up to a value of ￡0.250m. The new Partnership included 17 members (it changed to 21 members in 2007), made up of:

• 5 community members (directly elected to each of the five Theme Groups).

• 5 statutory agency members including: West Midlands Police; Heart of Birmingham teaching Primary Care Trust; Job Centre Plus; Learning and Skills Council and the Birmingham Strategic Housing Partnership, who were each nominated to support a Theme Group.

• 2 City Council member places.

• 4 community. representatives (who were appointed by an Independen  Commission, taking account of skill imbalances, following the direct election of community representatives).

Theme Groups were essentially working groups formed by, and reporting to, the Partnership Board. Six Theme Groups established by the Partnership Board, they included:

• Community Leadership.

• Community Safety.

• Education and Lifelong Learning.

• Employment and Business.

• Health.

• Housing and Environment

These Theme Groups were given a clear mandate to focus on delivery of activities to achieve the High Level Outcomes. They had a number of tasks to manage, including strategy development, theme performance management (reviewing progress towards meeting financial and non-financial targets) as well as considering and making recommendations on applications for NDC funding. The composition of Theme Groups included the Partnership Board’s Community Members for that particular theme area, the Partnership Board’s Nominated Agency Member as well as the Theme Manager. Additional nonvoting members were also invited

onto Theme Groups as appropriate to assist with the various tasks. The

Theme Groups were chaired by one of the Community Members which

gave them a sense of ownership and responsibility.

Figure 10. Aston Pride Governance Structure

This structure worked well and the earlier focus on process issues was

avoided. No other committees were set up, which was common under other company-based NDC models. The Theme Group Managers were capable officers and were able to engage partners in developing strategies and projects.

By establishing the Community Regeneration Advisory Group (CRAG) the Partnership Board also put arrangements in place to provide community members with an opportunity to gain a better understanding of NDC issues as well as a forum through which to raise matters of concern with the Independent Chair and Executive Director.

Representatives from key agencies supported the partnership in various ways:

• Five key agencies were represented on the Board which demonstrated a high level of commitment and support to the programme.

• Many agencies attended the Theme Groups and were involved in the development of strategies, activities and projects.

• West Midlands Police seconded a Police Sergeant to lead the Community Safety Theme, and the Heart of Birmingham teaching PCT seconded a member of staff to lead the Health Theme for the duration of the programme. These secondments provided capable officers to help develop, align and manage activities and encouraged a high level of commitment from key partners throughout the Programme.

Birmingham City Council had two important roles in support of the NDC Partnership, as a key strategic partner and as the Accountable Body.

The City Council as both a strategic partner and key mainstream provider had an important role to play in supporting Programme delivery. Directorates worked in partnership with the Programme to design and deliver solutions that would contribute to the corporate priority of reducing deprivation differentials. As a strategic partner, the City Council was represented on the Partnership Board by elected members.

The Partnership had to work through an established Accountable Body, which took responsibility for the receipt and correct usage of NDC funding. In its role as the Accountable Body, the City Council was responsible for ensuring that proper financial management procedures and effective project appraisal and approval systems were in place (BCC, 2011)

Outcomes and discuss

Bearing in mind the fact that positive means more than average levels of change and negative scores lower than average or no changes, the Kings Norton NDC showed more improvement compared with national benchmarks (as shown in Table 1), on fourteen of twenty-four indicators. The most improvements were in people-related sector such as educational achievement, health and income. There were also positive outcomes in ‘place’ indicators as well.

On the other hand, Aston Pride showed the most improvement among all NDC partnership in England. The Aston NDC improved across nineteen out of twenty-four people and place based indicators, relative to the national benchmark average. More precisely, place indicators such as area satisfaction and feeling free from crime improved and people indicators such as education and employment were also greatly improved. Factors that contribute to these different outcomes could be various.

Figure 11.십일 Socio-demographic indicators of Aston and Kings Norton

NDC Area	Year	Per cent
		White	Employment (working age)	Noqualifications (working age)	Social housing	Health not good
Aston	2002	22	36	45	46	23
	2008	16	48	34	37	16
Kings Norton	2002	93	51	31	66	26
	2008	93	46	31	63	24

Source: DCLG (2015)

A central factor in this improvement could be the different geographic location. Aston Pride and Kings North Estates were identified as having relatively low residential mobility compared to other NDC areas. The Kings Norton NDC was characterized as an ‘Isolate’ area where in and out moves are largely restricted to similar or poorer areas. Isolates are neighbourhoods associated with a degree of entrapment of poor households who are unable to break out of living in deprived areas. Moreover, the Kings Norton estate is further from the city centre where there is more chance of employment, while lack of work place could lead working age people and their young families to move away. Thus, people who want to learn and get a job move out, so that more vulnerable people could be left. Aston Pride, on the other hand was identified as a Transit area where in and out moves toward less deprived areas are not restricted.

Different patterns of spending may be another reason. Splitting expenditure of each NDC partnerships would be one way to find out what each partnership emphasized in their programme which could be mayor reason that could lead different achievements. The difference of resource allocation between two NDC is interesting.

Aston spent less than 40% of resources on place related interventions, whereas Kings Norton spent almost 70%. The Kings Norton NDC, for instance, spent 39% of total expenditure on housing and environmental improvements including New Future program, a property re-construction programme, compared to 15% at Aston. (figure 12.) This result is the opposite of the normal pattern of other partnerships that more spending on place related interventions shows better outcomes. This difference come from the difference of housing quality as well as social housing proportion between two partnerships.

Figure 12 Total expenditure of Aston Pride and Kings Norton NDC by theme

Source: (BCC, 2011), (Shared Intelligence, 2009)

In 2002, Kings Norton contained 66% social housing which was three times the city average and twenty percentage higher than Aston. The vacancy rate of housing stock was 5% which was also higher than the city average and other deprived areas in Birmingham. In addition, as Birmingham City Council was carrying out a stock transfer in 2002, partnerships might invest in improving housing environment instead of local authorities. (Shared Intelligence, 2009). Whereas the level of social housing was low than in Kings Norton, the condition of housing stock was fairly good in Aston. As a result residential satisfaction in Aston was fairly high, 78% in 2002, so that improving housing quality was not a high priority.(BCC, 2011). These differences allowed Aston partnership to invest and concentrate on more various projects such as Aston Hall and Park as a common use community facilities expecting continuous benefits for many years instead of housing issues.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

In terms of regeneration process, there should be a more engaged and intensive role for the community. It appears that more direct involvement opportunities lead to more successful outcomes. NDC evaluation clearly shows the linkages between resident participation and success of initiatives.

The opportunities for participation were very limited in regeneration initiatives in Korea. The government provide opportunities for public participation in the process of urban planning but it is arguably indirect. As well as, as regeneration initiatives are directly related to properties, tenants who do not have ownership could not participate in decision making process. This led to the exclusion of socially deprived groups who tend to live in more deprived areas. Therefore, it is necessary to reform the system to allow all residents (not only owners) the opportunity to participate directly in decision making process that affects their life.

Furthermore, the definition of participation should be redefined in Korea. In other word, community should be involved from the stage of plan design and establishment their vision. For example, as local residents know more than external planners about their areas, they can prioritize and allocate resources in the UK. But in Korea residents merely express opinions about plans drawn up by authorities or developers. Involvement at an early stage is more important because it is strongly related to resident capacity improvement for long term community-led initiatives. In order to enable communities to define and develop local issues, government need to provide more participation opportunities reflecting regional characteristics.

Moreover, policy makers should have a lot of patience. Regeneration is a long-term and time-consuming project in any area. In contrast to previous state-led or developer-led physical development projects, community-led regeneration (whether it includes physical improvement initiatives or not), will take longer time to carry through. This is because residents need time to recognize what they can and cannot do and also to improve their capacity to affect such regeneration plans. This is the reason NDCs allocate ten years to such work compared with previous ABIs of four to five years. However, so-called community-led regeneration in Korea lasts no more than five years from start to end and there is little or no experience in community-led initiatives. In case of UK initiatives, it took at least two years to collect ideas and set up action plans. Thus, although urban policy is affected by political timescales and elections, policy makers should ensure an adequate timescale for regeneration initiatives.

When it comes to outcomes, a holistic approach is needed in regeneration initiatives. It is widely acknowledged that deprived areas are facing multiple issues, so that regeneration should deal with multi-dimensional problems and tackle socio-economic issues such as health, education and employment, as well as the physical upgrading of deprived areas. As UK government recognized these features of regeneration, (though the points of emphasis varied depending on political leadership), holistic regeneration programmes were introduced in the 1960s and NDCs was the flagship programme. However, the key programmes of regeneration in Korea seem to still focus on physical improvement and this is little different from previous initiatives even if there is less large scale demolition. A more holistic approach should thus be considered in Korea.

In terms of effectiveness, focusing on place-related interventions showed more positive outcomes than people-related initiatives in holistic approaches. It is acknowledged that intervention in one area can produce inter-related outcomes, and this linkage was stronger in place-related interventions. In addition, when reviewed after the end of programmes, most ABIs focused on place-related initiatives (more precisely on housing and environment outcomes) and on building new houses and improving residential environment and acquiring community assets for sustainability.

ABIs in South Korea need to learn from the NDCs in the UK to ensure the longer term financial sustainability of projects. One way to achieve this is through community ownership of local assets. As studied above, partnerships promoting community regeneration consider uses of government funding. To secure sustainability, partnerships try to acquire physical assets which may be either land or buildings. Community assets enable the communities to support long-lasting initiatives, to generate revenues themselves for financial independence from local authorities, and to invest more resources in tackling other problems in their communities.

Assets can be either owned or leased for a long time, but the price needs to be affordable for communities. The benefits of local ownership of assets such as enhanced community capacity; increased financial sustainability and increased local employment have been demonstrated by a number of studies. (Aiken et al.). . Thus, government should provide institutional supports, for instance by transferring assets at less than market value or enabling long-term leases of at least 10 years alongside ABIs. This also benefits local authorities as they can save on the budget for maintaining such assets and for implementing related welfare policies.

There are limitations which further studies should seek to resolve. Firstly, there is a need to be look more at the different social and government systems of the UK and South Korea and how these affect regeneration. Factors such as funding, service delivery and resident representative systems (that can affect organizing partnerships between agency and community) need to be reviewed and developed. In addition, the differences in social housing systems that can affect security of residence and resident participation is also needed to be studied more.

Secondly, to better understand community led urban regeneration, more case studies from other countries such as Germany and Netherland (where this has been a major issue) are also needed. More research is also needed on policy monitoring systems and related legal systems for adopting recommendations.

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